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Abstract—Backscatter wireless communication is an emerging
technique widely used in low-cost and low-power wireless sys-
tems, especially in passive radio frequency identification (RFID)
systems. Recently, the requirement of high data rates, data
reliability, and security drives the development of RFID systems,
which motivates our investigation on the physical layer security
of a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) RFID system. In this
paper, we propose a noise-injection precoding strategy to safe-
guard the system security with the resource-constrained nature of
the backscatter system taken into consideration. We first consider
a multi-antenna RFID tag case and investigate the secrecy rate
maximization (SRM) problem by jointly optimizing the energy
supply power and the precoding matrix of the injected artificial
noise at the RFID reader. We exploit the alternating optimization
method and the sequential parametric convex approximation
method, respectively, to tackle the non-convex SRM problem
and show an interesting fact that the two methods are actually
equivalent for our SRM problem with the convergence of a
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point. To facilitate the practical im-
plementation for resource-constrained RFID devices, we propose
a fast algorithm based on projected gradient. We also consider
a single-antenna RFID tag case and develop a low-complexity
algorithm which yields the global optimal solution. Simulation
results show the superiority of our proposed algorithms in terms
of the secrecy rate and computational complexity.
Index Terms—MIMO backscatter wireless communication,
RFID, physical layer security, artificial noise, optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
BACKSCATTER wireless communication, remarkable forits low energy consumption and low product cost, is an
emerging technology which is widely used [1]–[4]. One of its
most prominent applications is in radio frequency identifica-
tion (RFID) systems. RFID enables identification from a dis-
tance, thereby facilitating the handling of manufactured goods
and materials [1], [2]. By employing backscatter modulation
[3] to send back the data and on-tag power harvesting [4] to
supply the power, RFID is promoted by its longevity, efficacy,
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and energy efficiency. It is believed that RFID will become
one of the most crucial techniques to realize the Internet of
Things (IoT) [5], which allows objects to be sensed and creates
more efficient interactions between the physical world and
computer-based systems.
As a contactless technology in a short range, RFID systems
are expected to fulfill the aim of reducing handling time
despite the augment of data stored in RFID tags [6], [7].
Concerning this higher expectation of the data rate and data
reliability for novel RFID applications, the implementation of
the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) scheme appears to
be effective and promising [8], [9], which attracts considerable
research interests [10]–[14]. It is shown in [10] that adopting
multiple antennas can extend the coverage of backscatter
RFID systems and improve system capacity under the spatial
multiplexing configuration. Furthermore, the authors in [11],
[12] show that multi-antenna techniques can significantly
improve the data reliability of the RFID system. The space-
time coding scheme is explored in [13], [14] for MIMO RFID
backscatter systems. Apart from the above analytical studies,
several real experiments concerning multi-antenna RFID tags
have also been conducted [15]–[17]. The measurement results
in [15] show that read range can be improved when multiple
antennas, instead of a single antenna, are equipped at the RFID
tag. In addition, the authors in [16] propose a method for
channel measurements in MIMO RFID systems. The authors
in [17] showcase two multi-antenna techniques for RFID tags
operating at 5.8 GHz. The MIMO scheme has been extensively
investigated and recognized as an efficient approach to further
extending the information-carrying ability of RFID [9].
Due to the widespread deployment of RFID tags, the privacy
concern for users, such as clandestine physical tracking and
personal information protecting, also makes a great challenge
to the design of RFID systems, because the transmission is
vulnerable to eavesdropping due to the broadcast nature of
backscatter communication [18]–[20]. Most of previous works
concerning RFID security issues mainly focus on lightweight
cryptography such as in [20]–[22]. However, they still have
some restrictions on the secret key generation and distribution
from eavesdropping and practical limitations in terms of size,
cost, and computation [22], [23]. Fortunately, in recent years
physical layer security (PLS), as an alternative or comple-
ment to cryptography, has drawn considerable attention in
strengthening the security of wireless communications since
perfect secrecy is provided. The theoretical basis for PLS
approaches lies in the notion of the secrecy capacity/rate,
which was pioneered by Wyner in [24]. Since then, wealth
2of relevant research has achieved a significant success in
the security of conventional wireless communication systems
[25]–[32]. The main idea of PLS approaches, in addition to
exploiting the randomness inherent to wireless channels [27],
is to manually construct equivalent channels via signal design
and power allocation such that the superiority of the equivalent
legitimate channel to the equivalent wiretap channel can be
established [33]. One of promising approaches is to send an
artificially generated noise to deteriorate the channel condition
of eavesdroppers. This conception of applying artificial noise
(AN) to enhance the secure transmission is first introduced
in [28], and it is further studied in [29]–[32]. These studies
have also been generalized to the cooperative relay system
[33]–[36].
However, there is only little work to study the security of
backscatter systems from the perspective of PLS. In [23], a
physical layer noise injection scheme is proposed to strengthen
the security of backscatter wireless systems under a single-
input single-output (SISO) system setting where all terminals
employ a single antenna, and it is shown that the proposed
approach yields significant performance gains. To the best
of our knowledge, no work has been done on the PLS of a
MIMO backscatter system, even though the MIMO technique
is promising in enhancing the security due to extra spatial
degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas [29]. Note
that the PLS approaches for the conventional MIMO system
cannot be directly used into the MIMO backscatter system
due to the following two reasons. For one thing, the channel
model of the MIMO backscatter system is quite different
from the conventional one and usually is modeled as the so-
called dyadic backscatter channel [4], which makes it hard
to formulate the considered security problem. For another
thing, the passive backscatter system is typically resource-
constrained and thus requires low-complexity algorithms in
practice. Particularly, the trade-off between secrecy perfor-
mance and computational complexity should be taken into
account in the algorithm design of the MIMO backscatter
system.
Based on the above observations, in this paper we focus
on solving the security issues of a MIMO RFID system from
the perspective of PLS, wherein we take full account of the
resource-constrained nature of RFID devices. The novelty and
main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
1) The MIMO backscatter wireless communication is studied
from the perspective of PLS for the first time and a noise-
injection precoding strategy is proposed to strengthen the
security of the system.
2) The alternating optimization (AO) method and the sequen-
tial parametric convex approximation (SPCA) method are,
respectively, invoked to tackle the non-convex secrecy rate
maximization (SRM) problem. Furthermore, we show an
interesting fact that the two methods are actually equivalent
for our problem.
3) Particularly, a custom-designed algorithm based on pro-
jected gradient (PG) is proposed for fast implementation,
which is especially beneficial to the resource-constrained
RFID device.
4) As a complement, the case where the tag has only a single
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Fig. 1. The MIMO backscatter system, consisting of a RFID reader, a RFID
tag, and a passive eavesdropper.
antenna is studied, and the global optimal solution can be
obtained by one-dimensional search. Moreover, a nullspace
AN design in this case is further proposed, and it is shown
in the simulations that this scheme obtains the secrecy rate
which is close to the optimal one and enjoys an extremely
low computational complexity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section
II, we present the system model and develop the formulation
for the achievable secrecy rate of a MIMO RFID backscatter
system. In Section III, we focus on the SRM problem with
a multi-antenna tag, and the equivalence of the AO and
SPCA methods is analyzed. In Section IV, we propose a
fast algorithm to efficiently solve the SRM problem with a
multi-antenna tag. The case where the tag equips with only a
single antenna is studied in Section V. Numerical simulations
and analysis for the proposed schemes and algorithms are
presented in Section VI before the conclusions drawn in
Section VII.
Notations: AT , AH , det(A) and Tr(A) represent the
transpose, Hermitian transpose, determinant and trace of a
matrix A, respectively. I denotes an identity matrix. A  0
means that A is a Hermitian positive semidefinite matrix. E{·}
and (·)∗ denote the expectation and conjugate, respectively.
y = [x]+ means that yi = max{0, xi} for every i. diag{x}
denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements taken from
vector x. ei denotes a column vector whose the i-th element is
1 and 0 elsewhere. x ∼ CN (µ,Σ) means that x is a random
vector following a complex circular Gaussian distribution with
mean µ and covarianceΣ. ◦ represents the Hadamard product.
II. SECURE MIMO BACKSCATTER SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a RFID system consisting of a multi-antenna RFID
reader with M transmitting antennas and N receiving anten-
nas, a RFID tag with L antennas, and a passive eavesdropper
with K receiving antennas as shown in Fig. 1. For notational
simplicity, we use the terms “reader” and “tag” as commonly
used in RFID systems hereinafter.
3The basic idea of realizing the RFID backscatter wireless
communication is as follows: First, the reader transmits a
continuous carrier wave (CW) to power up the tag. Then, the
passive tag reflects back the CW signal by changing the dif-
ferent impedance loads of its antennas according to its stored
secret information such as identification data. This procedure
can be regarded as a backscatter modulation, where the secret
information, to be transmitted from the tag to the reader, is
modulated on the reflected CW signal by the tag. Finally,
the reader extracts the desired information by estimating and
decoding the echoed back signal after the backscatter mod-
ulation. During the whole backscatter procedure, the reader
continuously transmits a CW signal to power up the tag and
concurrently receives the echoed back signal modulated by the
tag, namely, it works in a full-duplex mode. Thus, the received
self-interference or leaked signal directly from its transmitter
to receiver needs to be canceled. Whereas in practice, it is
difficult for the reader to perform this cancellation without
any signal leakage. Thereby in this work, we use β ∈ [0, 1] as
in [37] to denote the self-interference attenuation factor which
reflects the capacity for the reader to cancel the interference
from the transmitted signal in the received signal. Based on the
procedure above, under the assumption that all the channels
undergo slow frequency-flat fading, the received signal at the
reader is given by1
yr = HprQH
H
tpx+
√
βHtrx
′ + nr, (1)
where x ∈ CM×1 is the signal transmitted by the reader2 with
the total power constraint Tr(E{xxH}) ≤ P . HHtp ∈ CL×M ,
Hpr ∈ CN×L, and Htr ∈ CN×M represent the channel from
the reader to the tag, the channel from the tag to the reader,
and the self-interference channel at the reader, respectively.
nr ∼ CN (0, σ2rI) is the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) at the reader. Q ∈ CL×L is the tag’s information
signaling matrix which represents the backscatter gain at the
tag. The structure of Q describes the backscatter modulation
by the tag, during which the RF tag absorbs and scatters radio
signals by its L antennas. This signaling matrix takes several
different forms depending upon the physical implementation
of the modulation circuitry and RF tag antennas [11]. In this
paper, we consider a common scenario employed in [4], [10]
that the signaling matrixQ takes the form of a diagonal matrix,
given by
Q = diag{q1, q2, · · · , qL} = diag{q}. (2)
We assume that the elements in vector q are i.i.d. and
E{qqH} = I.
In this paper, we propose a noise-injection precoding
scheme to create additional interference at the eavesdropper
1This signal model is first proposed in [10], wherein self-interference is
not considered and only spatial domain is involved. The model in [10] is
further generalized to the space-time coding model in [4], [13], [14] where
temporal domain is also taken into account. In this paper, we focus on transmit
optimization against eavesdropping only in spatial domain and thus adopt the
signal model similar as that in [10].
2Since the reader receives its transmitted signals from both the backscatter
and its self-interference channels at different time instants, we adopt x′ in
(1) to denote the signal received directly from the reader’s self-interference
channel and distinguish it from the signal received from the backscatter
channel, i.e., x. A similar notation will be also used in (6).
and thus to strengthen the security of the system. The transmit
vector x takes the structure x = s + z, where s ∈ CM×1
is the CW signal to provide the tag with the power supply
and we consider the conventional case as in uniform query3
that the reader transmits a constant CW with the transmit
power equally allocated among all its transmit antennas, i.e.,
s =
√
Ps/M1M , where Ps denotes the power allocated to
the CW signal. z ∈ CM×1 is an AN vector, generated by the
reader and injected into the transmitted CW signal, to interfere
with the eavesdropper. Let Λz , E{zzH}  0 denote the
spatial covariance matrix of the AN. The total power constraint
at the reader now changes to
Ps +Tr(Λz) ≤ P. (3)
For the considered MIMO RFID channel, the reader uses
the noisy observation of HprQHHtpx to estimate the unknown
signal q with the CW signal s. We can rewrite HprQHHtpx as
HprQH
H
tpx = Hprdiag{HHtpx}q
=
√
PsHprdiag{
√
1/MHHtp1M}q
+Hprdiag{HHtpz}q.
(4)
For notational simplification, let Dtp , diag{
√
1/MHHtp1M}
and Ftp , diag{HHtpz}. We can rewrite (1) as
yr =
√
PsHprDtpq+
√
αHprFtpq+
√
βHtrz
′ + nr, (5)
where α ∈ [0, 1], following from the setting in [23], is the
attenuation factor which denotes how successful the reader is
in canceling the backscattered AN. Note that the CW signal
s′, received directly from the self-interference channel Htr at
the reader, has been removed from (5) due to the fact that
the standardized CW signal is commonly known and can be
eliminated by the reader.
Similar to the reader, the received signal at the eavesdropper
is given as
ye =
√
PsHpeDtpq+HpeFtpq+Htez
′′ + ne, (6)
where Hpe ∈ CK×L and Hte ∈ CK×M are the tag-
eavesdropper and reader-eavesdropper channel matrices, re-
spectively. ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eI) is the AWGN at the eavesdrop-
per. HpeFtpq is the backscattered AN signal modulated by
the tag’s information signal, while Htez′′ is the injected noise
term received directly from the reader-eavesdropper channel.
It should be noted that, unlike the reader, the eavesdropper
cannot perform AN attenuation due to the absence of the
prior knowledge about the random AN signal z transmitted
by the reader. However, the CW signal received directly from
the reader-eavesdropper channel can be eliminated by the
eavesdropper due to the fact that the standardized CW signal
is commonly known [23]. That is why this signal term does
not appear in (6).
3There exist two different query methods widely adopted in the existing
literature: the conventional uniform query [4], [10], [13], [38] and the newly
developed unitary query adopted in the design of space-time coding for MIMO
Backscatter RFID [14], [39]. In contrast to the diversity analysis in space-time
coding where the message is coded over both space and time, here we focus
on the transmit design against eavesdropping only in spatial domain and thus
adopt conventional uniform query.
4The achievable secrecy rate for a given secure transmission
scheme determines the performance limit of PLS. Unfortu-
nately, the exact expression of the secrecy rate here is difficult
to obtain due to the non-Gaussian distribution of the combined
signal and AN terms HprFtpq and HpeFtpq received at the
reader and the eavesdropper, respectively. However, following
the similar method adopted in [23], we regard these terms
as interference and obtain an approximation of the achievable
secrecy rate given by [25]
Cs = [Cr − Ce]+, (7a)
Cr ≈ log2 det(IN + PsHprDtpDHtpHHprR−1r ), (7b)
Ce ≈ log2 det(IK + PsHpeDtpDHtpHHpeR−1e ), (7c)
where the covariance matrices of the interference and noise
are given by
Rr = αHprEz[FtpF
H
tp]H
H
pr + βHtrΛzH
H
tr + σ
2
rIN , (8a)
Re = HpeEz[FtpF
H
tp]H
H
pe +HteΛzH
H
te + σ
2
eIK , (8b)
with
Ez[FtpF
H
tp] = diag
{
E[HHtpz ◦ (zHHtp)T ]
}
= E[HHtpzz
HHtp] ◦ I
= (HHtpΛzHtp) ◦ I
=
L∑
i=1
(
eTi H
H
tpΛzHtpei
) (
eie
T
i
)
.
From (7) and (8), to maximize the achievable secrecy rate
in (7a) under the total power constraint in (3), the power allo-
cation between the AN and the CW as well as the covariance
matrix of AN Λz needs to be carefully designed since the
jamming signal from the reader degrades the performance of
both the reader itself and the eavesdropper. The case where
the tag has multiple antennas will be studied in the next
two sections, while the scenario where a single antenna is
employed at the tag will be investigated in Section V.
III. MULTI-ANTENNA TAG
In this section, we consider the case where the tag equips
with multiple antennas. The considered problems are first for-
mulated as matrix optimization problems in Section III-A, and
then the AO and SPCA methods are introduced to solve the
SRM problem in Section III-B and Section III-C, respectively.
The equivalence of the two methods in the considered problem
will be illustrated in Section III-D.
A. Problem Formulation
To facilitate analysis, we first recast the secrecy rate in (7a)
as
Cs(Ps,Λz) = ln det(Rr + PsA) + ln det(Re)
− ln det(Rr)− ln det(Re + PsB), (9)
where A , HprDtpDHtpHHpr and B , HpeDtpDHtpHHpe. Our
aim is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate in (9) under
the total transmit power constraint in (3). Mathematically, this
SRM problem can be formulated as follows:
max
Ps,Λz
Cs(Ps,Λz) s.t. (Ps,Λz) ∈ C, (10)
where the feasible set is defined as
C , {(Ps,Λz) | Ps +Tr(Λz) ≤ P, Ps ≥ 0,Λz  0}. (11)
As discussed in [29], [33], a simplified and special design
of the general AN scheme in (10) is the so-called nullspace
AN scheme where the transmitted AN lies in the nullspace
of the legitimate user’s channel. In our MIMO backscatter
model, from (8a) we know that the reader receives two altered
copies of its transmitted AN from the backscatter channel and
the self-interference channel, respectively. When both the AN
copies cannot be perfectly eliminated at the same time and
the number of transmit antennas at the reader is adequate to
perform the nullspace AN precoding, namely M > L or M >
N , the AN transmitted by the reader can be designed to lie
in the nullspace of the reader-tag channel HHtp or the self-
interference channel Htr, respectively. To be specific, we can
construct the injected AN as z = Vw, and now we have
Λz(W) = VWV
H , (12)
where V contains all the right singular vectors of HHtp or Htr
corresponding to zero singular values, and W = E{wwH}
is an (M − L) × (M − L) or (M − N) × (M − N)
positive semidefinite matrix to be optimized, respectively.
Mathematically, the nullspace SRM problem is formulated as
follows:
max
Ps,W
Cs(Ps,Λz(W)) s.t. (Ps,W) ∈ C. (13)
Since (13) is just a degenerate form of the SRM problem in
(10), we will focus on solving (10) hereinafter.
The SRM problem in (10) is non-convex and difficult to
tackle due to the non-concave property of the term − ln det(·)
in the objective function in (9). The AO and SPCA methods
are the two methods widely exploited in tackling non-convex
matrix optimization problems [30], [40], [41], and it will
be interesting to see in the sequel that the two methods
are actually equivalent under our SRM problem. Therefore,
our approach is to reformulate the non-concave term to a
concave one by exploiting the AO and SPCA methods. The
two methods will be, respectively, introduced in the next two
subsections.
B. AO Method for SRM
The main idea of the AO method is to exploit the coordinate-
wise convexity property of the non-convex problem where
optimization over two subsets of variables is non-convex, but
optimization with respect to (w.r.t.) one while fixing the other
is convex. To re-express the general SRM problem in (10) as a
form that can be tackled by the AO method, we first introduce
the following lemma.
Lemma 1: [42] Let X ∈ CN×N and X ≻ 0, then
the function − ln det(X) can be equivalently rewritten by
5importing an auxiliary variable S ∈ CN×N as
− ln det(X) = max
S0
−Tr(SX) + ln det(S) +N, (14)
and the right-hand side of (14) has the optimal solution S⋆ =
X−1 in a closed form.
From Lemma 1, one can easily see that the non-concave
term can be changed to a linear (and thus concave) term
w.r.t. the original optimization variable by adding an auxiliary
variable. By applying Lemma 1 to the objective function in
(9) via setting X0 = Rr and X1 = Re + PsB, we have the
following equivalent formulation of problem (10):
max
Ps,Λz,S0,S1
ln det(Rr + PsA) + ln det(Re)
− Tr(S0Rr) + ln det(S0)
− Tr[S1(Re + PsB)] + ln det(S1)
s.t. (Ps,Λz) ∈ C, S0  0, S1  0.
(15)
Note that we have dropped the constant K+N in the objective
of problem (15) for simplicity. The equivalent problem in (15)
is non-convex w.r.t. (Ps,Λz,S0,S1). However, it is not hard
to see that problem (15) is convex w.r.t. either (Ps,Λz) or
(S0,S1) while fixing the other. We can exploit this coordinate-
wise convexity property to use the AO method to solve
the problem. To be specific, let (Pns ,Λnz ,Sn0 ,Sn1 ) denote the
solution obtained at the n-th AO iteration. We iteratively use
the values at the (n − 1)-th iteration to obtain the ones at
the n-th iteration by alternatingly solving the following two
optimization problems for n = 1, 2, · · · ,
(Sn0 ,S
n
1 ) = arg max
S0,S10
ln det(S0)− Tr(S0Rn−1r )
+ ln det(S1)− Tr[S1(Rn−1e + Pn−1s B)], (16a)
(Pns ,Λ
n
z ) = arg max
(Ps,Λz)∈C
ln det(Rr + PsA) + ln det(Re)
− Tr(Sn0Rr)− Tr[Sn1 (Re + PsB)]. (16b)
From Lemma 1, the optimal solution to problem (16a) takes
a closed form and can be obtained by
Sn0 = (R
n−1
r )
−1, Sn1 = (R
n−1
e + P
n−1
s B)
−1. (17)
Problem (16b) is convex, and thus can be numerically solved.
The solution to our SRM problem can be obtained by it-
eratively calculating (17) and solving problem (16b) until
the corresponding secrecy rate fulfills the given accuracy
requirement.
As a basic result of AO, the method proposed above
produces non-descending objective values. More specifically,
we have Cs(P 0s ,Λ0z) ≤ Cs(P 1s ,Λ1z) ≤ · · · ≤ Cs(Pns ,Λnz )
[30]. In addition, we will show by Theorem 1 in Section III-D
that the sequence {Pns ,Λnz } generated by the AO method con-
verges to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point of the original
problem in (10).
C. SPCA Method for SRM
As an alternative way, we can also use the SPCA method
to solve the SRM problem in (10). The basic idea of the
SPCA method is to approximate a non-convex problem by a
sequence of convex problems. In each convex problem, every
non-convex constraint is replaced by an appropriate inner but
convex one. Generally, the convergence rate of the SPCA
method is fast. More details about SPCA can be found in
[40], [41].
To apply the SPCA method, we first transform the non-
concave terms in the objective function in (9) to the inner-
approximated but concave ones. Note that the non-concave
terms in the objective function are actually convex w.r.t.
the optimization variable. Here the first-order Taylor’s series
approximation can be used as a global underestimator of the
convex function − ln det(X) [43, p. 69]. More specifically,
the approximation for the function − ln det(X) w.r.t. X ≻ 0
around X0 is given by
− ln det(X) ≥ − ln det(X0)− Tr[X−10 (X−X0)]. (18)
From the right-hand side of (18), one can see that non-concave
terms can be changed to linear (and thus concave) ones by
exploiting this method.
By applying the approximation in (18) centering around the
point (Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) to non-concave terms in the objective
function in (9), we obtain (19) at the top of the next page where
the superscript n − 1 refers to the optimal solution obtained
at the (n − 1)-th iteration. In each iteration we perform the
approximation centering around the optimal solution obtained
at the previous iteration. At the n-th iteration, the original non-
convex SRM problem in (10) can be locally approximated by
the following convex optimization problem for n = 1, 2, · · · ,
(Pns ,Λ
n
z ) = arg max
(Ps,Λz)∈C
f0(Ps,Λz)
− f1(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )− f2(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ),
(20)
where
f0(Ps,Λz) , ln det(Rr + PsA) + ln det(Re) (21)
with f1(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) and f2(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
defined in (19). The solution to our SRM problem can be
obtained by iteratively solving problem (20) until the corre-
sponding secrecy rate fulfills the given accuracy requirement.
Like the AO method in the last subsection, the sequence
of objective values produced by the SPCA method is non-
descending. Moreover, we will show by Theorem 1 in the
next subsection that the sequence {Pns ,Λnz } generated by the
SPCA method converges to a KKT point of the original SRM
problem in (10).
Remark 1: As seen in Section III-A, the nullspace SRM
problem in (13) is just a degenerate form of the SRM problem
in (10) when the nullspace AN constraint in (12) is imposed.
Thus, once the general SRM problem in (10) is solved by the
AO or SPCA method, the nullspace SRM problem in (13) can
be easily solved in a similar way.
Remark 2: Generally, the AO and SPCA methods are two
totally different methods and either the AO or SPCA method
individually will give a solution. However, it is interesting to
see that the two methods are actually equivalent for our SRM
problem in the sense that the two methods can equivalently
lead to the same optimization problem. We will analyze this
equivalence in the next subsection.
6ln det(Rr) ≤ f1(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) , ln det(Rn−1r )
+ Tr
{
(Rn−1r )
−1
[
αHpr
((
HHtp(Λz −Λn−1z )Htp
) ◦ I)HHpr + βHtr(Λz −Λn−1z )HHtr]} , (19a)
ln det(Re + PsB) ≤ f2(Ps,Λz, Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) , ln det(Rn−1e + Pn−1s B) + Tr
{
(Rn−1e + P
n−1
s B)
−1[
Hpe
((
HHtp(Λz −Λn−1z )Htp
) ◦ I)HHpe +Hte(Λz −Λn−1z )HHte + (Ps − Pn−1s )B] }. (19b)
D. Equivalence, Convergence, and Complexity Analyses
As for the AO method, the equivalence can be verified by
putting (17) in (16b), and then we obtain the following convex
optimization problem at the n-th iteration:
(Pns ,Λ
n
z ) = arg max
(Ps,Λz)∈C
g(Ps,Λz, P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ), (22)
where
g(Ps,Λz, P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ) , f0(Ps,Λz)− Tr((Rn−1r )−1Rr)
− Tr[(Rn−1e + Pn−1s B)−1(Re + PsB)]. (23)
It is not hard to see that the objective function of problem (20)
obtained by the SPCA method and (23) only differ in some
added terms that are irrespective of our optimization variable
(Ps,Λz), and thereby have no effect on the optimization result.
This leads to the equivalence of the two methods for the
considered SRM problem.
The main reasons for this equivalence are summarized as
follows:
1) As for the SPCA method, the terms Rr and Re + PsB
in − ln det(·) of the objective function in (9) are linear
w.r.t. the optimization variable (Ps,Λz). This linear prop-
erty makes the terms − ln det(·) in the objective function
convex, and thus the approximation of the first-order Tay-
lor’s series in (18) can be applicable. The choice of this
approximation in the SPCA method makes the equivalence
between problem (20) obtained by the SPCA method and
problem (22) possible.
2) Concerning the AO method, Lemma 1 plays an important
role in this equivalence. It should be noted that the specific
way to apply the AO method actually depends largely
on the form of the considered problem. In our case, it
is the non-concave term − ln det(·) that makes Lemma 1
applicable, and then the AO method can be employed to
lead us to problem (22).
3) It can be observed that (14) in Lemma 1 of the AO method
is actually closely related to (18) in the SPCA method. This
is because (14) means that
− ln det(X) ≥ −Tr(SX) + ln det(S) +N,
for any X ≻ 0, S  0
S=X−1
0=====⇒− ln det(X) ≥ −Tr[X−10 (X−X0)]− ln det(X0),
for any X ≻ 0, (24)
which is exactly (18).
Since we have shown that both the AO and SPCA methods
for our SRM problem are equivalent to iteratively solving the
convex optimization problem in (22), the two methods actually
have the same convergence result and computational com-
plexity. We first give the convergence result in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: Both the AO and SPCA methods produce non-
descending achievable secrecy rates and converge to a KKT
point of the original SRM problem in (10).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
At each AO or SPCA iteration, the convex optimization
problem in (22) can be solved by using a general-purpose
convex optimization toolbox, such as CVX [44], to obtain
a numerical solution. This computational complexity can
be approximated by the complexity of solving a standard
semidefinite program (SDP) problem through the interior point
method, though problem (22) is not a standard SDP problem.
Problem (22) has M2 independent real and imaginary parts
in the Hermitian matrix Λz . Let J denote the total number
of the AO or SPCA iteration. Then the complexity cost of
the AO or SPCA method is at most O(JM7) [45], while the
cost reduces to at most O(J(M −L)7) or O(J(M −N)7) for
the two nullspace SRM problems in (13). These computational
complexity costs are usually much less when the modern SDP
solver like SeDuMi [46] in CVX is employed.
IV. A FAST PG ALGORITHM FOR SRM WITH A
MULTI-ANTENNA TAG
As we have indicated, the RFID system is typically
resource-constrained compared with the conventional wireless
communication system. Thus, it particularly requires low-
complexity algorithms in practice. In this section, by exploiting
the characteristic of the feasible set of the SRM problem in
(10), we develop a fast and low-complexity algorithm based
on projected gradient (PG) to replace the inefficient CVX while
solving the convex problem in (22).
Let (Pn,ks ,Λn,kz ) denote the result obtained in the k-th inner
PG iteration at the n-th outer equivalent AO or SPCA iteration.
The general PG iteration is given by [47]
(P¯s
n,k+1
, Λ¯n,k+1z )
= PC(P
n,k
s + µk∇Psgn,k,Λn,kz + µk∇Λzgn,k), (25a)
(Pn,k+1s ,Λ
n,k+1
z )
= (Pn,ks ,Λ
n,k
z ) + νk(P¯s
n,k+1 − Pn,ks , Λ¯n,k+1z −Λn,kz ),
(25b)
where µk > 0 and 0 < νk ≤ 1 are positive step sizes, PC
denotes the projection on the feasible set C in (11), i.e.,
PC(P˜s, Λ˜z) , arg min
(Ps,Λz)∈C
(Ps − P˜s)2 + ‖Λz − Λ˜z‖2F ,
(26)
7∇Λzgn,k =βHHtr [(Fn,k)−1 − Sn0 ]Htr +HHte[(Rn,ke )−1 − Sn1 ]Hte
+
L∑
i=1
{
αTr
[(
(Fn,k)−1 − Sn0
)
Ci
]
+Tr
[(
(Rn,ke )
−1 − Sn1
)
Di
] }
Ei, (27a)
∇Psgn,k =Tr[(Fn,k)−1A]− Tr(Sn1B). (27b)
Ci , Hpreie
T
i H
H
pr, Di , Hpeeie
T
i H
H
pe, Ei , Htpeie
T
i H
H
tp, F
n,k , Rn,kr + P
n,k
s A. (28)
and (∇Psgn,k,∇Λzgn,k) denotes the gradient of the function
g(Ps,Λz, P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ) in (23) w.r.t. (Ps,Λz) at the point
(Pn,ks ,Λ
n,k
z ), which is shown in (27) at the top of the page
where Ci, Di, Ei, and Fn,k are defined in (28) with Sn0 and
Sn1 defined in (17). To be specific, ∇Λzg here is actually the
conjugate derivative of a real function g w.r.t. a Hermitian
matrix, which falls into the field of generalized complex-
valued matrix derivatives and follows from [48]. Note that
once the initial value for the PG method (Pn,0s ,Λn,0z ) is
chosen to be feasible, i.e. (Pn,0s ,Λn,0z ) ∈ C, it is clear that
the sequence {Pn,ks ,Λn,kz } generated by the PG method is
feasible for any fixed n due to the projection operation in (25a)
and the condition 0 < νk ≤ 1. By exploiting the structure of
the set C, the projection PC in (26) can be formulated in a
semi-closed form, which is shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let Λ˜z = Udiag{η˜}UH be the eigenvalue
decomposition of Λ˜z . Then the optimal solution to problem
(26) is given by
PC(P˜s, Λ˜z) = (P
⋆
s ,Udiag{η⋆}UH), (29)
where P ⋆s and η⋆ are unique and take the form
[P ⋆s ,η
⋆T ]T =
[
[P˜s, η˜
T ]T − λ⋆1
]+
, (30)
with 1 , [1, 1, . . . , 1]T and the water-filling level λ⋆ chosen
as the minimum nonnegative value such that P ⋆s +η⋆T1 ≤ P .
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.
We remark that the water-filling level λ⋆ in Theorem 2 can
be efficiently obtained by some practical algorithms based on
hypothesis testing [49]. As for the choosing of the step sizes
µk and νk in the PG method, several strategies obeying the
Armijo rule [47, Section 2.3.1] can be exploited. Here, we fix
the second step size as νk = 1, while the backtracking line
search [43] is adopted to determine the first step size µk. In
this way, the iteration in (25) degenerates into
(Pn,k+1s ,Λ
n,k+1
z )
= PC(P
n,k
s + µk∇Psgn,k,Λn,kz + µk∇Λzgn,k). (31)
The iteration in (31) is guaranteed to converge to the global
maximum for the convex optimization problem in (22) [50],
and it achieves a good balance between the convergence rate
and computational complexity [51]. The procedure of back-
tracking line search for choosing µk is listed in Algorithm 1.
The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1), and typical algorithmic parameters
are µ0 = 1, γ = 0.5, and δ = 0.1. Algorithm 1 is referred to
as the Armijo search along the boundary of C [47], [50].
Algorithm 1 Backtracking Line Search for Choosing µk
Input: µ = µ0;
1: while true do
2: Compute (Pn,k+1s ,Λn,k+1z ) according to (31);
3: if gn,k+1 > gn,k + δ · {Tr[(∇Λzgn,k)H(Λn,k+1z −
Λn,kz )] +∇Psgn,k(Pn,k+1s − Pn,ks )
}
then
4: Break;
5: end if
6: µ = γµ;
7: end while
8: return µk = µ;
We summarize our fast algorithm for SRM, combining
the PG method for inner convex problem with the for-
merly proposed outer AO or SPCA iteration, in Algorithm
2, where Cns and gn,k are used to denote Cs(Pns ,Λnz ) and
g(Pn,ks ,Λ
n,k
z , P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ), respectively, for notational con-
venience.
The main computational complexity of Algorithm 2 lies in
the multiplication, inverse, and eigenvalue decomposition of
a matrix. To facilitate the complexity comparison with CVX
given in Section III-D, here we give the complexity cost of
Algorithm 2 w.r.t. M only, which is O(JRM3), where J
denotes the total iteration number of the outer AO or SPCA
method as before and R represents the average iteration num-
ber of the inner PG method at each outer iteration. Recalling
the computational complexity of CVX given in Section III-D,
we see that the improvement in that of the fast PG algorithm
is significant. This observation will also be verified by the
simulations in Section VI.
Note that this fast PG algorithm can be also applied to solve
the nullspace SRM problem in (13) after some modifications.
From the chain rule of the gradient, the gradient of the function
g(Ps,Λz(W), P
n−1
s ,Λz(W
n−1)) w.r.t.W at the pointWn,k
is given by
∇Wgn,k = VH∇Λzgn,kV, (32)
where V is defined in Section III-A. With the optimization
variable changed to W and the gradient changed to (32), we
can still apply Algorithm 2 to efficiently solve the nullspace
SRM problem in (13).
V. SINGLE-ANTENNA TAG
In the previous sections, we have solved the SRM problem
with a multi-antenna tag. In real applications, due to the
8Algorithm 2 Fast PG Algorithm for SRM
Input: P , n = 1, (P 0s ,Λ0z) ∈ C, ǫ1 > 0, ǫ2 > 0;
1: while |(Cns − Cn−1s )/Cn−1s | > ǫ1 do
2: k = 0, (Pn,0s ,Λ
n,0
z ) = (P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z );
3: while |(gn,k − gn,k−1)/gn,k−1| > ǫ2 do
4: Compute ∇Λzgn,k according to (27);
5: Compute the step size µk according to Algorithm 1;
6: Calculate (P˜s, Λ˜z) = (Pn,ks + µk∇Psgn,k,Λn,kz +
µk∇Λzgn,k);
7: Calculate (Pn,k+1s ,Λn,k+1z ) = PC(P˜s, Λ˜z) accord-
ing to (29)-(30);
8: k = k + 1;
9: end while
10: (Pns ,Λ
n
z ) = (P
n,k
s ,Λ
n,k
z );
11: n = n+ 1;
12: end while
13: return (P ⋆s ,Λ⋆z) = (Pns ,Λnz );
resource and cost constrained property of the RFID network,
currently a single antenna is usually used at the tag in the
market [12]. Thus, it is necessary to consider security issues
under the scenario where the tag has a single antenna, while
the reader and the eavesdropper have multiple antennas. It
should be noted that previously proposed methods can still be
exploited to obtain a local optimal solution for this scenario. In
this section, we focus on finding a low-complexity algorithm
which yields the global optimal solution to the SRM problem
with a single-antenna tag under some practical assumptions.
When the tag employs a single antenna, all the channels
form/to the tag reduce to vectors and we redefine Dtp ,√
1/MhHtp1M . To facilitate analysis and obtain the traceable
optimal solution to the SRM problem with a single-antenna
tag, here we make the following two assumptions:
1) The eavesdropper is not aware of the noise injection
scheme and thereby simply adopts maximum ratio combin-
ing (MRC) to deal with the received signal. Note that when
the noise injection scheme is known by the eavesdropper,
it may adaptively apply the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) receiver to mitigate the jamming from the reader.
The SRM problem under this scenario can be similarly
tackled by the methods used in the multi-antenna tag case.
2) The reader transmits the AN signal in the nullspace of its
self-interference channel, which is a practical assumption
mainly in that the reader can equip with only one more
antenna for transmitting compared with for receiving. It
should be noted that the mathematical model under this
assumption is similar to the one under the assumption that
the reader can perfectly cancel the AN received from the
self-interference channel, i.e., β = 0. Thus, for notational
simplicity we only consider the latter assumed situation in
this section.
Under the above two assumptions, the achievable rates in (7b)
and (7c) now change to
CMMSE,ZFr
= log2
(
1 + Ps|dtp|2hHpr(αhprhHpr(hHtpΛzhtp) + σ2rI)−1hpr
)
(a)
= log2
(
1 +
Ps|dtp|2‖hpr‖2
α‖hpr‖2(hHtpΛzhtp) + σ2r
)
and
CMRCe
= log2

1 + Ps|dtp|2‖hpe‖2
‖hpe‖2(hHtpΛzhtp) + h
H
peHteΛzH
H
tehpe
‖hpe‖2
+ σ2e

 ,
respectively, where (a) follows from the matrix inverse lemma.
The SRM problem with a single-antenna tag now becomes
max
Ps,Λz
1 +
Ps|dtp|
2‖hpr‖
2
α‖hpr‖2(hHtpΛzhtp)+σ
2
r
1 +
Ps|dtp|2‖hpe‖2
‖hpe‖2(hHtpΛzhtp)+h
H
peHteΛzH
H
tehpe/‖hpe‖
2+σ2e
s.t. Ps +Tr(Λz) ≤ P, Ps ≥ 0, Λz  0. (33)
In the following, we will show that although problem (33)
is still non-convex, its optimal solution is traceable. The basic
idea to solve problem (33) is to reduce the original problem to
a single-argument optimization problem, and then the optimal
solution can be efficiently obtained by one-dimensional search.
Before proceeding, we first give the following lemma about the
rank property of the optimal AN covariance Λ⋆z for problem
(33).
Lemma 2: The optimal AN covarianceΛ⋆z for problem (33)
is rank-one.
Proof: To show the optimal Λ⋆z is rank-one
for problem (33), we first let ‖hpe‖2(hHtpΛzhtp) +
hHpeHteΛzH
H
tehpe/‖hpe‖2 = s be fixed and the optimal Λ⋆z
must satisfy
Λ⋆z = argmin
Λz
hHtpΛzhtp
s.t. ‖hpe‖2(hHtpΛzhtp) + hHpeHteΛzHHtehpe/‖hpe‖2 = s,
Tr{Λz} ≤ P, Λz  0. (34)
To see more clearly, the above problem can be recast as
Λ⋆z = argmin
Λz
Tr{C1Λz}
s.t. Tr{C2Λz} = s, Tr{Λz} ≤ P, Λz  0, (35)
where C1 , htphHtp and C2 , ‖hpe‖2htphHtp +
HHtehpeh
H
peHte/‖hpe‖2. Problem (35) takes a semidefinite
relaxation (SDR) form of a complex-valued homogeneous
quadratically constrained quadratic program (QCQP) with two
constraints. According to the conclusion in [52], the SDR
is tight and the solution of problem (35) is rank-one. This
completes the proof.
In addition, we remark that the optimal solution to problem
(33) must satisfy the total power constraint with equality.
This can be shown by contradictory. Suppose that the optimal
solution to problem (33) is (P ⋆s ,Λ⋆z) with P ⋆s +Tr{Λ⋆z} < P ,
then we can construct a new feasible solution (P ⋆s , Λ¯z) such
that P ⋆s +Tr{Λ¯z} = P where Λ¯z = Λ⋆z+rrH , hHtpr = 0, and
9max
Ps,v
1 +
Ps|dtp|
2‖hpr‖
2
α‖hpr‖2(P−Ps)(vHhtphHtpv)+σ
2
r
1 +
Ps|dtp|2‖hpe‖2
‖hpe‖2(P−Ps)(vHhtphHtpv)+(P−Ps)v
HHHtehpeh
H
peHtev/‖hpe‖
2+σ2e
s.t. ‖v‖ = 1, 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P. (36)
max
Ps,t
y(Ps, t) ,
1 +
Ps|dtp|
2‖hpr‖
2
α‖hpr‖2‖htp‖2(P−Ps)t+σ2r
1 +
Ps|dtp|2‖hpe‖2
‖hpe‖2‖htp‖2(P−Ps)t+‖HHtehpe‖
2(P−Ps)r(t)/‖hpe‖2+σ2e
s.t. 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ps ≤ P. (38)
hHpeHter 6= 0. It can be easily verified that (P ⋆s , Λ¯z) yields a
larger objective value, which is a contradictory.
From the above discussions about the properties of the
optimal solution to problem (33), the AN covariance matrix
can be expressed as Λz = (P − Ps)vvH where ‖v‖ = 1.
We can further recast problem (33) as problem (36) shown at
the top of the page. Problem (36) is still difficult to handle, to
facilitate the further analysis we first consider the optimization
of v in problem (36). Let vHd1dH1 v = t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 where
d1 , htp/‖htp‖. By considering the following subproblem
r(t) , max
v
vHd2d
H
2 v s.t. v
Hd1d
H
1 v = t, ‖v‖ = 1,
(37)
where d2 , HHtehpe/‖HHtehpe‖, then problem (36) can be
reduced to problem (38) shown at the top of the page.
The following lemma gives the closed-from solution to the
subproblem in (37).
Lemma 3: [34] Let φ ∈ (−π, π] be the argument of
dH2 d1, κ = |dH1 d2| 6= 1. Then the optimal solution to problem
(37) and the corresponding objective function value are given
by
v⋆(t) =
(
κ
√
1− t
1− κ2 −
√
t
)
ei(π−φ)d1 +
√
1− t
1− κ2d2,
(39)
r(t) = 1−
(
κ
√
1− t−
√
(1− κ2)t
)2
. (40)
Now our aim reduces to solve the two-argument optimiza-
tion problem in (38). To solve problem (38), our method is to
first find the optimal P ⋆s (t) for any given t and then perform
the one-dimensional search w.r.t. t. To facilitate analysis, for
any given t we recast the objective function in problem (38)
w.r.t. Ps as
yt(Ps) =
1 + aPs1+bPs
1 + cPs1+dPs
, (41)
where
a , |dtp|2‖hpr‖2/(σ2r + Pl1), b , −l1/(σ2r + Pl1),
c , |dtp|2‖hpe‖2/(σ2e + Pl2), d , −l2/(σ2e + Pl2),
l1 , α‖hpr‖2‖htp‖2t,
l2 , ‖hpe‖2‖htp‖2t+ ‖HHtehpe‖2r(t)/‖hpe‖2.
Let the first order derivative of yt(Ps) in (41) be zero, we
obtain
(ad2 + acd− abc− b2c)P 2s + 2(ad− bc)Ps + (a− c) = 0.
(42)
The solution to the above quadratic equation is given by
P ts,1(2) =
ad− bc±√ac(b− d)(a+ b− c− d)
b2c+ a(bc− d(c+ d)) , (43)
and the optimal power allocated to the CW signal at the reader
for any given t becomes
P ⋆s (t) = argmax
Ps
y(Ps, t), Ps ∈ {P ts,1, P ts,2, P} ∩ [0, P ],
(44)
which can be easily computed. Substituting (44) into problem
(38) yields a single-argument optimization problem, which can
be handled by searching t in the interval [0, 1]. Once we have
obtained the optimal t⋆, the optimal power allocated to the
CW signal and the optimal AN covariance matrix are given by
P ⋆s = P
⋆
s (t
⋆) andΛ⋆z = (P−P ⋆s )v⋆(t⋆)v⋆(t⋆)H , respectively.
As in Section III-A, here we also consider a suboptimal
nullspace AN scheme. More specifically, we can restrict the
transmitted AN from the reader to lie in the nullspace of
the reader-tag channel htp. Under this condition, we directly
have t = 0 and the only remaining thing is to obtain P ⋆s (0)
by solving the low-complexity problem in (44). Thus, the
computational complexity can be vastly reduced. Note that
when the total available power or the number of antennas at the
transmitter of the reader is large, this nullspace AN constraint
incurs a loss of only one degree of freedom which is negligible
compared with the large number of antennas. So from this
view, this scheme is practical and beneficial for resource-
constrained RFID devices and it achieves a good trade-off
between secrecy performance and computational complexity.
This observation will be verified by the simulation in the next
section.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents some numerical results to evaluate
the secrecy rate performance of the proposed noise-injection
precoding schemes as well as their computational efficiency.
In the simulations, the self-interference channel at the reader is
generated as Htr = H˜tr, and the other channels are assumed
to undergo a path loss combined with a small-scale fading,
namely Hk = d−γ/2k H˜k, k ∈ {tp, te, pe, pr}, where dk is the
distance between two nodes, γ is the path loss exponent, and
each element of H˜j , j ∈ {tr, tp, te, pe, pr}, is an independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random
variable with zero mean and unit variance. Note that the
statistic distribution of the self-interference channel at the
reader has not been well understood yet [53]. Thus, for
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Fig. 2. The secrecy rates Cs achieved by different schemes versus the total
transmit power of the reader P under (a) multi-antenna and (b) single-antenna
tag cases. For both the two cases, the attenuation factors of the backscattered
AN are the same α = 0.6. For the multi-antenna tag case, the attenuation
factor of the self-interference β = 0.3, and β = 0 for the single-antenna tag
case.
The simulation settings are as follows, unless otherwise
specified: The antenna numbers at the receiver and the trans-
mitter of the reader, the tag, and the eavesdropper are N = 2,
M = 3, L = 2, and K = 3, respectively. The typical transmit
power at the reader P = 10 dBm, and the AWGN power at the
reader and the eavesdropper σ2e = σ2r = −20 dBm. The path
loss exponent is set as γ = 2, and we set typical distances
between two nodes as dk = 2 m, k ∈ {tp, te, pe, pr}.
We initialize our algorithms with the initial power allocation
ρ0 = 1, P 0s = ρ
0P, Λ0z = (1 − ρ0)(P/M)I and set with the
termination parameters ǫ1 = 10−3 and ǫ2 = 10−5. In addition,
to obtain a larger secrecy rate in the general AN design, we use
the solution obtained by the nullspace AN scheme as the initial
parameter. Note that under the above antenna number setting
the reader can perform two nullspace AN schemes, namely,
the no backscattered AN (NBS-AN) scheme and the no self-
interference AN (NSI-AN) scheme where the transmitted AN
lies in the nullspace of the reader-tag channel and the self-
interference channel, respectively. All results to be shown are
averaged over 1000 randomly generated channel realizations.
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy rates achieved by different schemes
versus the transmit power P under both the multi-antenna tag
TABLE I
AVERAGE RUNNING TIME (IN SECS.) VERSUS TRANSMIT POWER
Method Transmit Power (dBm)
-3 1 5 9 13
Multi-Antenna
Tag Case
General-CVX 11.8927 12.1476 12.3213 12.5497 12.4153
General-Fast PG 0.2266 0.2725 0.3118 0.3787 0.4902
Single-Antenna
Tag Case
Optimal AN 0.0164 0.0164 0.0164 0.0164 0.0164
Nullspace AN 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
case (cf. Fig. 2(a)) and the single-antenna tag case (cf. Fig.
2(b)). In the multi-antenna tag case, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of the general AN design obtained by the proposed
fast PG algorithm in Algorithm 2 (labeled as “General-Fast
PG”), and compare it with the general AN design obtained
by CVX (labeled as “General-CVX”), the two nullspace AN
schemes, and the scheme without AN. It can be observed from
Fig. 2(a) that the advantage of the proposed noise-injection
scheme is significant compared with the scheme without AN
especially when P is large. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the general
AN design outperforms the two nullspace AN schemes as it
is free from the nullspace AN constraint. One can also see
that the proposed fast PG algorithm achieves almost the same
secrecy rate as CVX does. In addition, to illustrate the relative
computing efficiency of the proposed algorithms for SRM,
we present the corresponding average running time in Table
I4. One can see that the fast PG algorithm is much faster
than CVX. In the single-antenna tag case, we compare the
performance of the optimal AN design with the nullspace AN
precoding. It can be observed from Fig. 2(b) that the secrecy
rate achieved by the nullspace AN precoding is very close
to the optimal one. Moreover, through Table I we see that
the nullspace AN precoding enjoys a much lower compu-
tational complexity compared with the optimal AN design.
The nullspace AN precoding here achieves a good trade-off
between secrecy performance and computational complexity.
These low-complexity algorithms are especially beneficial to
resource-constrained RFID devices.
Fig. 3(a) plots the secrecy rates achieved by different
schemes versus the attenuation factor of the backscattered
AN α under the multi-antenna tag case. From the figure, we
see that the secrecy rates decreases as α increases. Note that
the secrecy rate achieved by the NBS-AN scheme remains
constant. This is because the injected noise is fully nulled out
at the tag in this scheme. From Fig. 3(a), the secrecy rate
achieved by the general AN design drops down significantly
and approaches to the one obtained by the NBS-AN scheme
when α becomes larger. This is because the backscattered AN
received by the reader cannot be well attenuated at this time.
Another interesting observation is that the performance of the
NSI-AN scheme is close to the general AN design when α is
small, and the performance gap of the two schemes becomes
larger as α increases. This is because the NSI-AN scheme is
close to the optimal scheme only when the self-interference
dominates, namely α is small.
4 The average running time listed in Table I is obtained by a desktop
with MATLAB as the simulation tool. This result is only for the purpose of
relative comparison between different algorithms, and the measurement of the
practical running time on a typical RFID device is out of the scope of this
paper.
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Fig. 3. (a) The secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the
attenuation factor of the backscattered AN α where the attenuation factor
of the self-interference is fixed as β = 0.3, and (b) the secrecy rates achieved
by different schemes versus the attenuation factor of the self-interference β
where the attenuation factor of the backscattered AN is fixed as α = 0.6.
Both figures are under the multi-antenna tag case.
Fig. 3(b) depicts the secrecy rates achieved by different
schemes against the attenuation factor of the self-interference
β under the multi-antenna tag case. We can clearly see that
the secrecy rates decrease with an increase in β. Note that the
secrecy rate achieved by the NSI-AN scheme remains constant,
because the self-interference is fully nulled out at the reader
in this scheme. It can be seen from Fig. 3 that no matter how
α or β changes the NSI-AN scheme is always superior to the
NBS-AN scheme. This is because the received backscattered
AN at the reader goes through both the reader-tag and the
tag-reader channels and thus experience a double path loss
compared with the received AN from the self-interference
channel. Hence, the received AN due to self-interference
generally dominates in the received signal at the reader, and
thus the secrecy rate achieved by the NSI-AN scheme is much
closer to that achieved by the general AN design. Similarly,
this nullspace scheme can serve as a low-complexity method
which achieves a good trade-off between secrecy performance
and computational complexity in the RFID system.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy rates achieved by different schemes
when we increase the number of the reader’s transmit antennas
M (cf. Fig. 4(a)) or the eavesdropper’s antennas K (cf. Fig.
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Fig. 4. (a) The secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the number
of the reader’s transmit antennas M , and (b) the secrecy rates achieved by
different schemes versus the number of the eavesdropper’s antennas K . The
attenuation factors of the backscattered AN and self-interference are α = 0.6
and β = 0.3, respectively. Both figures are under the multi-antenna tag case.
4(b)) under the multi-antenna tag case. Again, we can see
that the superiority of noise-injection schemes on SRM is
significant. Note that from Fig. 4(b), the NBS-AN scheme
and the scheme without AN cannot even achieve a positive
secrecy rate when the number of the eavesdropper’s antennas
is larger than six. As shown in Fig. 4(a), the two nullspace AN
schemes achieve almost the same secrecy rate as the general
AN design does, when the number of the reader’s transmit
antennas satisfies M > 7. This is not surprising because
a large number of transmit antennas brings abundant spatial
degrees of freedom and the performance loss incurred by the
nullspace AN constraint is negligible. Under this situation, it is
beneficial for the reader to perform the nullspace AN schemes
to reduce the computational complexity and obtain the near-
optimal performance.
We then study the impact of the eavesdropper’s location
on the secrecy rate performance. For simplicity, we assume
that the reader, the tag, and the eavesdropper are located on
a straight line in this order. Fig. 5 shows the secrecy rates
achieved by different schemes versus the tag-eavesdropper
distance dpe ranging from 0.8 m to 2 m under the multi-
antenna tag case, where the reader-tag distance dtp is set to
either 2 m (indicated by the solid line) or 2.5 m (indicated
12
0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Tag−Eavesdropper Distance dpe [m]
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
 [b
its
/s/
Hz
]
 
 
General AN
NSI−AN
NBS−AN
w/o AN
dtp=2.5 mdtp=2 m
Fig. 5. The secrecy rates achieved by different schemes versus the tag-
eavesdropper distance dpe under the multi-antenna tag case. The reader-tag
distance dtp is set to either 2 m (indicated by the solid line) or 2.5 m (indicated
by the dashed line). The reader, the tag, and the eavesdropper are located on
a straight line in this order. The attenuation factors of the backscattered AN
and self-interference are α = 0.6 and β = 0.3, respectively.
by the dashed line). From Fig. 5, we see that the secrecy rate
strongly depends on the distances between the nodes due to
the power-law decay of the path loss. Indeed, the secrecy rate
under the small reader-tag distance is larger than that under
the large one. Moreover, the secrecy rate increases significantly
as the tag-eavesdropper distance increases. In particular, when
dtp = 2 m and the eavesdropper is very close to the tag (e.g.
dpe = 0.8 m), from Fig. 5 the general AN design can achieve
a positive secrecy rate larger than 0.7 bits/s/Hz, while the
scheme without AN cannot even achieve a positive secrecy
rate. This implies that the proposed noise-injection scheme
and the optimization of the AN covariance matrix can give
the secrecy rate a sharp boost when the eavesdropper is very
close to the tag.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied security issues in a MIMO
RFID backscatter system from the perspective of PLS. First,
we have proposed a noise-injection precoding scheme. Then,
we have changed the non-convex SRM problem to a sequence
of convex ones by exploiting the AO and SPCA methods,
respectively. Interestingly, we have shown a fact that the two
methods are actually equivalent for our SRM problem. More-
over, to facilitate the implementation for resource-constrained
RFID devices, a fast algorithm based on the PG method
has been proposed. As a complement, we have studied the
single-antenna tag case and derived an algorithm yielding the
global optimal solution. Numerical results show the supe-
rior secrecy rate performance of the proposed noise-injection
precoding schemes and the low computational complexity of
the proposed algorithms. Furthermore, the proposed nullspace
schemes can achieve a good balance between secrecy per-
formance and computational complexity for the resource-
constrained RFID system.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here we only show the convergence of the SPCA method
for our SRM problem, and the same convergence result holds
for the AO method due to the equivalence of the two methods
in Section III-D. We divide the proof into two steps: First, we
show that the SPCA method produces non-descending achiev-
able secrecy rates and converges to a limit point; Second, we
further show that the method converges to a KKT point of the
SRM problem in (10).
At the n-th iteration of the SPCA method, let (Pns ,Λnz ) be
the optimal solution to problem (20), and it is straightforward
to see that the optimal solution (Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) at the (n−1)-th
iteration is only a feasible solution at the n-th iteration of the
SPCA method. Thus, we have
f0(P
n
s ,Λ
n
z )− f1(Pns ,Λnz , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
− f2(Pns ,Λnz , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
≥ f0(Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )− f1(Pn−1s ,Λn−1z , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
− f2(Pn−1s ,Λn−1z , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
= Cs(P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ). (45)
On the other hand, from (19) we have
f0(P
n
s ,Λ
n
z )− f1(Pns ,Λnz , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z )
− f2(Pns ,Λnz , Pn−1s ,Λn−1z ) ≤ Cs(Pns ,Λnz ). (46)
Combining (45) with (46) leads to Cs(Pns ,Λnz ) ≥
Cs(P
n−1
s ,Λ
n−1
z ), which completes the proof for the non-
descending property of the achievable secrecy rates produced
by the SPCA method. Note that the achievable secrecy rate
Cs is up-bounded for any given transmit power P . Thereby
we conclude that the proposed SPCA method converges to a
limit point.
The KKT-point convergence result can be straightforwardly
verified from [40, Theorem 1]. From [40, Step 1], we know
that the first-order Taylor’s series approximation in (18) sat-
isfies the constraints for ensuring the SPCA method. Then
from [40, Theorem 1], the convergence to a KKT point of the
original problem is guaranteed. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To fulfill the proof, we first illustrate the original projection
problem in (26) can be reduced to a simplex projection
problem given by
(P ⋆s ,η
⋆) = argmin
Ps,η
(Ps − P˜s)2 + ‖η − η˜‖2
s.t. Ps ≥ 0, η ≥ 0, Ps + ηT1 ≤ P. (47)
By unitary invariance of the Frobenius norm, problem (26)
is equivalent to
min
(Ps,Λz)∈C
(Ps − P˜s)2 + ‖Λz −Udiag{η˜}UH‖2F
⇐⇒ min
(Ps,Λz)∈C
(Ps − P˜s)2 + ‖UHΛzU− diag{η˜}‖2F
⇐⇒ min
(Ps,Λˆz)∈C
(Ps − P˜s)2 + ‖Λˆz − diag{η˜}‖2F , (48)
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where Λˆz , UHΛzU. It can be easily seen by contradiction
that the optimal solution Λˆ⋆z to problem (48) must take the
form of a diagonal matrix. Let Λˆz = diag{η}, and then
problem (48) can be equivalently changed to the simplex
projection problem in (47). From diag{η⋆} = UHΛ⋆zU, we
obtain the structure of the optimal solution as shown in (29).
As for the simplex projection problem in (47), it is well
studied in [55] and its optimal solution is given by the water-
filling solution in (30). This completes the proof.
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